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ON PASCAL'S WAGER AND INFINITE UTILITIES 
John By! 
In this paper I discuss some objections to Pascals' Wager based on the notion 
of an infinite utility. It is alleged that infinite utilities result in decisional and 
mathematical indeterminacies that invalidate Pascal's Wager. Although vari-
ous resolutions to these objections have been proposed, these in turn have 
shortcomings. It is argued that the indeterminacies can be readily avoided by 
treating the infinities as limits. It is suggested that, in situations where only 
one bet can be placed, the expected utility should be replaced by the most 
probable average utility. By this standard the Wager is found to fall short if 
the probability of God's existence is taken to be small. 
Pascal's Wager purports to demonstrate that it is rational to try to bring about 
theistic belief. The form of Pascal's Wager that concerns us goes as follows. 
If God exists, the pay-off to the believer is infinite; if God does not exist the 
loss to the believer and the gain to the non-believer are both finite. Hence as 
long as there is a finite chance, no matter how small, that God exists the 
expectation of belief exceeds that of unbelief. Thus it is rational to take steps 
to bring about belief. 
Various objections have been raised against the usage of infinity in this 
argument. 1 These involve primarily the charge that infinite pay-offs give rise 
to decisional and mathematical indeterminacies. While these objections have 
recently been responded to by Jeffrey Jordan,2 his resolution in turn exhibits 
some deficiencies. I shall propose a simple alternative approach for dealing 
with the indeterminacy objections. 
The Wager differs from most wagers in that everything must be staked on 
one bet. In such cases it is questionable whether the expected utility is the 
proper criterion to use. In the final section I shall discuss an alternative, the 
most probable average utility, which seems to be more rational. 
I 
The first objection to the usage of infinite utilities goes as follows. Suppose 
we can choose two courses of action. Action A makes an infinite reward likely 
with a probability of 0.5; action B with probability 0.001. The utility of an 
outcome consists of the benefits that would result if that outcome obtains; 
the expected utility of an act is determined by multiplying the utility of each 
possible outcome of the act with its associated probability. In this case the 
expected utilities for acts A and B are given by: 
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I. EU(A) = (0.5)(00) + (0.5)(0) = 00 
2. EU(B) = (0.001)(00) + (.999)(0) = 00 
It seems that EU(A) = EU(B). Since the expectation is infinite for both A and 
B, why should we choose A? Here we have what Jordan calls a decisional 
indeterminacy: it would be rational to choose the act leading to the larger 
expected utility, but here the two are equal and we can thus make no rational 
choice on the basis of expected utility. 
Jordan accepts the equality of the two expected utilities and concurs that 
the Wager, in its original form, fails. However, he asserts that the Wager can 
be saved by augmenting it with an additional decision-theoretic principle. He 
defends the plausibility of the principle that, if a number of acts all have 
infinite expected utility, one should perform that one that is most likely to 
bring about the pay-off. 
While this principle does not seem unreasonable, and while it does seem 
to rescue Pascal's Wager in this particular case, it has a rather limited range 
of application. As we shall see in the next section, Jordan must construct a 
different method to solve various mathematical indeterminacies. We shall 
now present a simple alternative approach that resolves both types of inde-
terminacies. 
Consider how the infinite utilities arise. Pascal writes: 
.. .it would be foolish of you when you are forced to gamble not to risk your 
life in order to win three lives in a game. But in fact there is an eternity of 
life and of happiness at stake.3 
The emphasis here is on the fact that the future life is eternal. One must 
choose between an eternity of happiness on the one hand or an eternity of 
annihilation or wretchedness on the other hand.4 Eternity starts at death and 
goes on forever.5 
Let us therefore take the infinite utility to arise primarily from the notion 
of an unending happy existence, the essential characteristic being that of 
unbounded time. Suppose that the infinite reward consists of H units of 
happiness per day multiplied by an endless number of days. For believers H 
would be some large positive number corresponding to an appropriate state 
of happiness; for unbelievers H would be zero (for annihilation) or some large 
negative number corresponding to an appropriate state of wretchedness. We 
could then consider the infinite utility to be the limit of HT, where T is a 
large number of days, as T increases to infinity. Taking the future life as 
consisting of a finite time T, the expected utilities of acts A and Bare: 
3. EU(A) = (0.5)(HT) +(0.5)(0) = 0.5 HT 
4. EU(B) = (O.OOI)(HT) +(0.999)(0) = 0.001 HT 
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The relative utility is EU(A)/EU(B) = (0.5 HT)/(O.OOI HT) = 500. Since T 
always cancels out, this result will hold even as T increases to infinity: 
5. limT->~ [EU(A)IEU(B)] = IimT->~ [(0.5HT)/(0.00lHT)] = 500 
In short, we still merely choose that act that will maximize the relative 
expected utility. Hence the indeterminacy can readily be removed by taking 
the limit of a finite quantity as it increases to infinity. No additional deci-
sion-theoretic principle need be applied. 
Note that this is similar to the question of who is richer: person A who 
accumulates x dollars per day for an eternity, or person B who accumulates 
2x dollars a day for the same eternity? It is clear that at any particular time 
B will be twice as rich as A. Thus B will always be richer than A, even though 
both ultimately become infinitely rich. In the case that both options are 
equally likely, the limit approach to the expectations will prefer B. Jordan's 
principle, however, breaks down here since both options have an infinite 
utility and have equal probability, leading to a decision indeterminacy. 
If it be insisted that the infinite reward is actually a double infinity of an 
eternity of infinite happiness, this could be handled in a similar fashion by 
taking also the limit of a boundless H as it approaches infinity. 
One might object that the infinity thus approached is only a potential 
infinity, not an actual completed infinity. To this we respond that, first of all. 
it is not clear that Pascal's Wager requires an actual, completed infinity. All 
that is necessary is that this timespan is greater than any finite number we 
can think of. Certainly, from a human point of view, the future eternity is 
only an indefinite, potential infinite that will never be completed. Moreover, 
it is evident that if, as in the above example, a quantity has the same value 
at any future time then this value will be valid for all eternity, regardless as 
to whether we consider this eternity to be an actual completed infinity or 
merely a potential infinity. 
The limit approach has the advantage of being compatible with standard 
Bayesian principles, except for the fact that many standard formulations of 
Bayesian theory reject unbounded utilities. Since unbounded utilities are 
realistic (at least for those who believe, along with Pascal, in a future eter-
nity), any incompatibility of such utilities with Bayesian principles must be 
considered a deficiency in Bayesian theory. 
II 
A second indeterminacy arises as follows. Suppose there is a very small 
probability that there exists a devil who punishes theistic believers with 
infinite hell. Jordan considers the case where a certain act (belief in a theistic 
god) has a (0.45-x) probability of bringing about an infinite outcome 
(heaven), a 0.55 probability of no afterlife and a very remote probability of 
x resulting in an infinite disutility (hell). The EU of this act would be: 
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6. EU = (0.45-x)(00) +(0.55)r +(x)(-oo) = 00 + -00 = ? 
where r is a finite utility and x is a very small number. In this case we seem 
to have a mathematical indeterminacy. How can we decide what value the 
EU should have? 
Jordan accepts the view that the mathematical indeterminacy is real. His 
resolution is to remove the infinite disutility (-00) from the calculation. He 
justifies this on the ground that this possibility is so remote that it warrants 
nothing but neglect. 
One might object that any non-zero probability, however small, multiplied 
by infinity still yields an infinite utility. To this Jordan responds that every 
act carries with it possible outcomes that involve infinite utilities, since every 
act might be punished with an infinite disutility by some bizarre god. Hence 
every act carries with it the above sort of indeterminacy. Thus, Jordan argues, 
just as we properly neglect very remote decisions in mundane decisions, we 
are justified in doing so in Pascali an decisions also. 
He concedes, however, that if x is as large as 0.01 then the indeterminacy 
is not thus removable. Jordan then goes on to argue that the latter case is, 
from Pascal's point of view, not realistic: Pascal directed his Wager against 
people for whom the only real outcomes were either theism or naturalism. 
They would not have attached much value to x. Thus, according to Jordan, 
we are justified in ignoring the indeterminacy. 
Frankly, I don't find this resolution very convincing. First of all, the re-
moval of the infinity disutility strikes me as directly contrary to the spirit of 
Pascal's Wager. Pascal argued that as long as there was any finite chance that 
God exits - no matter how small - then infinite reward will favour the EU 
for belief. In the words of Pascal: 
For in this game you can win eternal life, eternal happiness. You have one 
chance of winning against a finite number of chances of losing, and what 
you are staking is almost nothing. Surely that settles it. Wherever there is 
infinity, and where there is not an infinity of chances of losing against the 
chance of winning, why hesitate? Surely you must stake everything then.6 
Pascal does not allow for some finite threshold probability that allows us to 
ignore remote but non-zero possibilities. Such a manoeuvre would permit 
naturalists to defuse the Wager by assigning sufficiently low probability to 
God's existence and then removing the infinite utility. Also, Jordan leaves 
Pascal's Wager as indeterminate, thereby invalidating it, for those who estimate 
probability x to be small but still non-negligible (e.g., in the order of 0.01). 
These difficulties arise because Jordan again concedes too much strength 
to the objection. An easier resolution is to use the same approach as above. 
Again, take T as the number of days in the life here-after and take the limit 
as T approaches infinity. This yields: 
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7. limT .... ~ [(0.45-x)HT +0.55 r +(x)(-HT)] = limT-->= [(0.45-2x)HT +0.55 
r] = +00 
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for x < 0.225. Thus, as long as the probability of God's existence outweighs 
that of the disutility, the EU is positive infinity. 
This is similar to the question of what our assets would be if we acquire 
2x dollars a day for an eternity but spend x dollars per day. It is clear that, 
however far we look into the future, our income will always exceed our 
expenses and our net assets will increase to +00, rather than ending up as an 
indeterminate [00 + -00]. 
In summary, the infinite utilities in Pascal's wager need not involve any 
decisional or mathematical indeterminacies. Nor do they require any augmen-
tation of the standard version of the Wager with certain decision-theoretic 
principles. Of course, this conclusion does not demonstrate the validity of 
Pascal's Wager; it only asserts that the usage of infinite utilities need not, in 
itself, be problematic. 
III 
While I have thus far defended Pascal's Wager, I am nevertheless convinced 
that it is flawed. What concerns me is the fact that the Wager, unlike most 
gambling games, asks us to stake everything on one bet. The obvious signifi-
cance of an infinite utility for an outcome is that, even though that outcome 
may be very improbable, it still generates an infinite expected utility. Yet I 
wonder whether in such cases the EU is indeed the pertinent quantity that 
should determine our rational choice. 
Consider a simple example. Suppose we have an opportunity to stake our 
entire fortune (say $100,000) on a 0.001 chance of winning a billion dollars. 
The expectation of betting is 
8. EU(bet) = (.999)(0) + (0.001)(1,000,000,000)= 1.000,000 
If we refrain from betting, thereby keeping our $100,000, the expectation is 
EU(no bet) = 0)(100,000) = 100,000. Thus, by Pascal's logic we would be 
foolish not to bet. Yet if we do bet we stand a very good chance (99.9%) of 
losing everything. Out of every thousand persons who take on the bet all but 
one ends up bankrupt. Is it then really rational to risk the family fortune on 
such a long-shot, even if the possible reward may be very great? 
The difficulty is that the EU will yield us the average expected winnings 
only in the long run, if we bet many times. If we can place only a few bets 
than it seems more rational to consider the most probable average utility 
(hereafter referred to as MU): the most probable distribution of outcomes, 
multiplied by their respective utilities and then averaged. If we bet n times 
then the most probable distribution of outcomes with probabilities (pI, p2, ... ) 
will be (np!, np2, ... ), rounded off to the nearest integer. Thus, in the above 
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case, if we can place 10000 bets the most probable distribution for prob-
abilities (.999, 0.001) is (9990, 10). Then the MD is given by: 
9. MU(bel) = [(9990)(0) + (10)(1,000,000,000)]110000 = 1,000,000 
In this case it would certainly be rational to bet. Note that here the MD equals 
the ED. This will always be the case if n, the number of bets, is sufficiently 
large. For small n, however, this will not hold true, particularly not for n = 
1. In that case the probability distribution (0.999, 0.001) leads to a most 
probable outcome of (1, 0). This yields an MD: 
10. MU(hel) = [(1)(0) + (0)(1,000,000,000)]11 = 0 
This compares with a MD(no bet) of 100,000. 
I maintain that in such situations as these, where everything is risked on a 
small number of bets, it is MD, rather than ED, that should be used when 
comparing the values of different acts. Let me stress that I am concerned here 
only with high-risk situations: there may well be low-risk cases where one 
might be rationally justified in a single-case bet on a low-probability out-
come. Of course, when the relative probabilities are of the same order (e.g., 
a 49% chance of winning) the matter becomes less clear. 
To illustrate this further, consider the St. Petersburg Paradox. This "para-
dox" is often raised in discussions of Pascal's Wager; Jordan also brings it 
up. In the St. Petersburg game one gets a pay-off of 2m if the first "heads" 
appears on the mth toss. The probability of the first "heads" appearing on the 
nth toss is 2m. The ED is therefore: 
11. EU = 0/2)(2) + (114)(4) + (1/8)(8) ... = 1 + I + 1+ ... = 00 
The paradox is that, even though the ED is infinite, in practice no one would 
pay much to play the game. How can it be resolved? Jordan suggests that we 
should simply ignore the higher m's since their probabilities are very small. 
This seems to me to be not only unwarranted, but also contrary to the spirit 
of the Wager, where even small probabilities can lead to a significant ED. I 
suggest that, here, too, it is more instructive to consider the MD, rather than 
the ED. The probability distribution is (1/2, 1/4, 1/8, ... ). Thus for n = 1 we 
have a most probable outcome distribution of (1/2, 114, 1/8, ... ) which rounds 
off to (1, 0, 0, ... ), yielding: 
12. MU(l) = [(1)(2)]11 = 2 
For n = 3 we get a most probable outcome distribution of (2, 1,0, ... ) yielding 
13. MU(3) = [(2)(2) + (1)(4)]/3 = 8/3 
For n = 7 the most probable outcome distribution is (4, 2, 1,0, ... ), with 
14. MU(7) = [(4)(2) + (2)(4) + (1)(8)]17 = 2417 
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In general, it turns out that 
15. MU(n) = [en + 1)( log2 (n+l»]ln 
Thus the value of the game as determined by the MU depends on how often 
you play, increasing to infinity only as n approaches infinity. This resolves 
the paradox: we can expect an infinite average payoff only if we play infi-
nitely often; for a finite number of plays we can expect only a finite average 
payoff. Once again, the MU seems more pertinent than the EU as a criterion 
for rational choice. 
What about Pascal's Wager? On the basis of expected utility, Pascal argues 
that it is rational to risk one life to gain an infinity of lives, as long as the 
chance of God's existence is non-zero. Yet, if this chance is small, say 0.01, 
the most probable distribution of outcomes is (.99, 0.01), which rounds off 
to (1, 0) and we have: 
16. MU(belief) = (1)(0) + (0)(00) = 0 
17. MU (nonbelief) = (1)(1) + (0)(0) = 1 life 
Thus, using the MU criterion, the nonbeliever may be pardoned for hesitating 
to risk his entire life for a one percent chance that God exists. From this point 
of view the Wager works only if the probability of God's existence can be 
shown to be considerably higher. To the extent that this requires additional 
lines of argumentation, it significantly weakens the Wager. 
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